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Honest question: What is up with that synopsis of B-2-0? It sounds like a litany of strange errors and mistakes that I would not expect soldiers of that experience and training to make.
> …the patrol inadvertently became separated into two groups… Neither of the two resultant groups followed the standard emergency rendezvous (ERV) procedure they had been trained to follow—and had previously followed the night before.
I’m sure there’s more to this than “one group stopped to make a phone call and the others kept going” but why? Strictly based on resources alone this seems like a bad idea but especially from an effectiveness standpoint.
> At about midday on 26 January… As more soldiers came out of the hut, MacGown aimed his rifle and fired but heard a click, indicating he was out of ammunition. It was apparent that Phillips had never reloaded the weapon after the initial contact on 24 January.
I don’t understand how this could possibly happen? In 2 days walking around hostile territory he never thought to reload? I feel like I would have *felt* the difference between a loaded and unloaded magazine, even on accident, over a 2 day period. I’m not trying to play armchair operator here but is this really a mistake that a veteran, special forces member would make?
> Lane died of hypothermia later that same morning after swimming the Euphrates with Pring
I’m really confused about this. After surviving the freezing cold of the desert for 5 days, not one, but *two* special forces soldiers decided to *go swimming* with little to no shelter as they’d opted to not use vehicles? Not to speak ill of the dead but isn’t this Boy Scout level survival knowledge?
The whole account of the story seems fishy to me. Am I missing some important information or do I just think too highly of special forces?